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I.

INTRODUCTION

Child exploitation enterprises are formal or informal
organizations dedicated to profiting from the sexual or physical
exploitation of children. This exploitation can include child
pornography production and distribution, prostitution, human
trafficking, and similar crimes. This paper will discuss the current
individual-based method of prosecuting these organizations and
suggest a shift to a more modern enterprise-based approach.
Specifically, this paper advocates for greater use of conspiracy law,
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),
and the Child Exploitation Enterprise statute (“CEE”) in child
exploitation cases.
Although it is difficult to estimate the value of child
exploitation worldwide, it forms a huge industry. Child
pornography in the United States alone is estimated to be worth
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approximately $20 billion.1 In 2001, University of Pennsylvania
researchers estimated that as many as 300,000 children were at
risk of human trafficking.2 In 2003, 1400 minors were arrested for
prostitution in the United States. Fourteen percent of these minors
were below the age of fourteen.3 In 2014, FBI agents in Southern
California rescued over 3600 minors from the sex trade.4 Homeless
and runaway children are especially vulnerable to exploitation; the
National Runaway Switchboard estimated that 28% of homeless
youth have been engaged in prostitution.5 Unfortunately, due to the
secretive nature of this industry, it is difficult to paint a more
specific picture of how far the child exploitation industry reaches.
The United States has a web of federal laws designed to fight
child exploitation. Federal prosecutors typically indict enterprise
members under the statutes that directly criminalize the harmful
behavior itself – production or possession of child pornography,
buying or selling of children, or human trafficking of minors. States
also have countless laws on these same matters; however, since
enterprises typically have members who operate in different states
or countries, most prosecution of exploitative enterprises takes
place at the federal level. This traditional approach to these
prosecutions is individual-based and focuses on the acts explicitly
taken by a specific defendant without addressing the larger issue of
the organization behind the individual.
As demonstrated by the success of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) in response to organized
crime, a more appropriate method of prosecution when handling
child exploitation enterprises is one that is enterprise-focused. This
method allows prosecutors to handle the increasing sophistication
of technology available to these enterprises and would result in
better sentencing of both the individual members and the enterprise
leaders. Prosecutors have already begun to make this shift in
practice but are not fully taking advantage of the tools currently
available to make this change.
1. United Nations General Assembly Report, Promotion and Protection of
All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development (July 13, 2009), www.crin.org/en/docs/A.H
RC.12.23.pdf.
2. Study, The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in the U.S.,
Canada and Mexico, ABOLITIONIST MOM (Sept. 18, 2001), abolitionistmom.org/
wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Complete_CSEC_0estes-weiner.pdf.
3. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Human Trafficking into and
Within the United States: A Review of the Literature, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
PLANNING AND EVALUATION (Sept. 30, 2009), aspe.hhs.gov/report/human-traffi
cking-and-within-united-states-review-literature#Trafficking.
4. Rob Hayes, FBI Multi-State Child Prostitution Sting: Hundreds Arrested,
Many Saved, ABC 7 NEWS (June 23, 2014), abc7.com/news/fbi-child-prostituti
on-sting-arrests-rescues/135659/.
5. Juliet Linderman, Child porn ring with 27,000 members run by Abita
Springs man, feds say, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 20, 2014), www.ncbi.nlm.ni
h.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2563846/pdf/354.pdf.
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Traditional federal statutes on child exploitation and their
limitations when handling organized enterprises will be discussed
in Part II of this paper. Part III will discuss the most traditional
enterprise-based charge under conspiracy law and how it can be
used against these enterprises. Part IV will discuss the novel use of
RICO to prosecute and provide a potential civil remedy for these
enterprises. Part V will explain the CEE statute, how it relates to
and incorporates precedent from more established law, and how it
compares to RICO. Part VI will discuss the best use of these actions
to prosecute child exploitation enterprises and recommend a shift
to enterprise-based charges to further improve efforts to combat
exploitation.

II. THE DRAWBACKS TO TRADITIONAL INDIVIDUALFOCUSED PROSECUTION WHEN HANDLING CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISES
Federal prosecutors handling child exploitation enterprises
usually indict the members of an exploitation group as if each were
acting alone. In a case involving loose associations between
members rather than organized enterprises, this individual-based
method of prosecution seems logical since it holds each individual
solely responsible for his own actions. However, ultimately, this
method is flawed because it overlooks the additional culpability
inherent in working with others to effectuate and profit from child
exploitation; it will ultimately be rendered ineffective due to
advances in technology. Therefore, federal prosecutors should move
towards a more enterprise-based approach whenever possible.
The main benefit of the current individual-based approach of
prosecution is that it is relatively straightforward. The prosecutor
simply presents evidence to show each defendant’s direct
involvement in the exploitation. When prosecuting an individual,
the government is not required to show association with or
involvement by anyone else. Furthermore, institutional knowledge
under this approach is strong; many crimes under the banner of
child exploitation, such as possession and distribution of child
pornography, are routine practice for federal prosecutors and
judges.
Another advantage of the individual-based approach of
prosecution when handling child exploitation is that it provides
strong remedies available in sentencing. Individuals convicted of
one of the various federal child pornography offenses may be
sentenced to up to forty years in prison.6 The sentence for buying
and selling a child for the purpose of sexual exploitation is “not less
than 30 years or for life.”7 The high end of these sentencing
6. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (2012).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2251A (2012).
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requirements is given out relatively often.8 Shifting to an
enterprise-based approach would not be likely to substantially
increase sentences.
Given the institutional knowledge, relative ease of prosecution,
and high sentencing range, it is clear an individual-based approach
to prosecuting child exploitation enterprises has some merit. The
problems with this approach are largely rooted in the nature of
enterprises. More specifically, individual-based prosecutions are
not well suited to handle enterprise members who were aware of the
exploitation and even profited off of it, but did not personally engage
with the victims.
The first problem with an individual-based approach is the lack
of accountability for the specific act of organizing and supervising
an enterprise. For example, a 2014 case involving two separate child
pornography distribution websites with over 27,000 members
resulted in ten federal prosecutions for receipt of child pornography.
The architect of both sites was charged with twelve counts of
production of child pornography and two counts of distribution.9
However, no one was charged with any form of conspiracy or
additional charges for their involvement in or creation of this
organized enterprise.
Another flaw with this method is that it omits information
about the broader context in which the offenses were created,
including the often rigorous and lengthy process of becoming a
member of an exploitative enterprise. Even internet-based groups
have traditional initiation and membership requirements. For
example, prospective members of one online child exploitation
enterprise ring had to possess “at least 10,000 images of pre-teen
children[,] agree to share them with other members” and pass an
intensive background check.10
In another enterprise, prospective members had to upload
material of “children under the age of 12 engaged in sexually
explicit activity.”11 Once members of the “Wonderland Club,” these
individuals had to continuously upload more material or be
promptly expelled from the organization. The process of obtaining
and maintaining membership in an exploitation enterprise makes
it clear that a defendant’s involvement is “intentional … and not
insignificant.”12
8. See, e.g., United States v. Groce, 784 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that
a statutory maximum sentence of 240 months for receipt of child pornography
was reasonable); United States v. McKinley, 647 Fed.Appx. 957 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding two lifetime sentences for sex trafficking and kidnapping to be
reasonable).
9. Hayes, supra note 4.
10. United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006).
11. Press Release, Child Predator Sentenced to Life Imprisonment in
Louisiana, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (July 18, 2012), ww
w.ice.gov/news/releases/child-predator-sentenced-life-imprisonment-louisiana.
12. United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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By focusing charges on individuals rather than enterprises,
prosecutors lose valuable insight into each enterprise member’s
dedication to the abuse and exploitation of children. Further,
ignoring the organization that provides support and affirmation to
its members ensures that its activities will continue even after
individual members have been successfully prosecuted.
Another issue with the current method of prosecution can arise
when prosecutors try to link leaders to the activities of an online
enterprise. Today this process is relatively easy; by obtaining the
leaders’ IP addresses and a log of the enterprise activity,
investigators can view a clear log of who was involved at each level
of the enterprise. However, as IP masking technology advances, this
link will become harder for prosecutors to identify, making it more
difficult to charge organizers and leaders of these enterprises
through this type of evidence.
An enterprise-based prosecution strategy would shift the
burden off the prosecution when collecting evidence against
enterprise leaders because it would focus on the activities of the
whole organization rather than the abuse committed by an
individual. This usually reduces the burden on the government to
link leaders to the hands-on offenses of their organization. Rather,
a showing that the leaders knew of the activities and did nothing to
intervene will typically result in a conviction under enterprisefocused charges.
A final problem with individual-focused prosecution arises
when the enterprise exists entirely offline. In these cases, it is
extremely difficult to connect the members of an exploitative
enterprise. The Catholic Church sex abuse cases demonstrate this
problem well. In 2002, it was reported that a large number of
Catholic priests had sexually abused minors over the course of
decades.13 Victims reported this abuse on many occasions, but
officials within the church simply moved the offenders to new
locations, concealing and facilitating further abuse. Because offline
communications are more difficult to retrieve, despite decades of
abuse prosecutors simply did not have enough evidence to convict
anyone other than the hands-on abusers themselves.

III. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL CONSPIRACY LAWS
Traditional conspiracy laws are the baseline enterprise-based
method of prosecution that can be useful in handling child
exploitation. Federal conspiracy law is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 371
and merely requires proof of “two or more persons” conspiring to

13. Michael Rezendes, Church allowed abuse by priest for years, THE
BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 6, 2002), www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/200
2/01/06/church-allowed-abuse-priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/s
tory.html.
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“commit any offense against the United States.” Conspiracy charges
are particularly useful for child exploitation enterprises in the same
context of RICO – when handling defendants for whom there is not
enough evidence to convict of the conspired crime itself.
To convict under § 371, the prosecution only needs to prove (1)
an agreement to break the law between the defendant and at least
one other person and (2) a member of this agreement made some
overt act towards accomplishing the goals of that agreement. An
agreement can be inferred from circumstantial evidence; there is no
requirement that it be explicit. Furthermore, the defendant does not
need to know every member of the conspiracy, nor does he need to
make any overt acts himself. Under the Pinkerton Rule, as long as
the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, he can be convicted
of the criminal actions of other members in furtherance of their
agreement.
Federal conspiracy law is relatively well suited for child
exploitation enterprise cases. Federal rules typically allow for crossjurisdictional joinder of all members of a conspiracy. This allows
prosecutors to put each member’s actions in the context of the entire
organization, theoretically aiding with the process of assigning guilt
and sentencing. Although § 371 has a maximum sentence of five
years and a maximum fine of $250,000, conspiracy charges are
typically stacked with more substantive charges.14 In practice,
Pinkerton allows § 371 to work similarly to RICO in that there is no
burden on prosecutors to prove each defendant was directly
involved with substantive crimes. The benefit conspiracy charges
provide in the trial process is worth the negligible boost in
sentences.
Unlike RICO, which is largely untested in this field, or the CEE
statute, which many courts are still unfamiliar with, conspiracy
charges have been consistently and successfully used against child
exploitation enterprises.15
One complication in using conspiracy law for child exploitation
enterprises is that a Double Jeopardy problem may arise when a
defendant is charged under both the CEE statute and § 371.
Supreme Court precedent established this principle for the CCE
statute in Rutledge v. United States.16 As discussed in Section III,
lower federal courts were not hesitant to apply it to CEE cases as
well.17 Both the CEE statute and § 371 would likely focus on the
14. There are other conspiracy laws with more generous sentencing options
that may apply to child exploitation besides 18 U.S.C. § 371. For example,
under 18 U.S.C. § 1594(d), conspiracy to commit sex trafficking may result in a
prison sentence up to life. However, this Note is focusing on conspiracy laws for
their effect on trials and in conjunction with other charges rather than as standalone remedies.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Grovo, 653 Fed.Appx. 512 (9th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715 (11th Cir. 1989).
16. 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996).
17. U.S. v. Wayerski, 624 F.3d 1342, 1351 (11th Cir. 2010); see also United
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same behavior, resulting in a Double Jeopardy problem. However,
careful drafting of charges can avoid this issue.18
Prosecutors should be mindful of potential Double Jeopardy
problems when using conspiracy law to tie together exploitative
enterprises. More proper methods would be to either limit
conspiracy charges to lower-level members of the enterprise or use
predicate offenses separate from those charged for § 371 for any
CEE charges.
The 2009 series of “Lost Boy” cases demonstrates this method
of avoiding Double Jeopardy. According to prosecutors, the principle
purpose of the Lost Boy forum was to “victimize children … [to]
facilitate the sexual abuse of children and enable its users to
produce and share child pornography.” 19 Most members of the ring
were charged with conspiracy to advertise child pornography, a
sentence that carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum, or lesser
conspiracy charges. Meanwhile, the ringleaders were charged under
the CEE statute. However, there was no central indictment and
little coordinated prosecution.
Although the prosecution arguably achieved the proper result
in the Lost Boy cases, their method was more inefficient than
necessary. There was almost no coordination between prosecution
efforts, and out of twenty-seven defendants, almost all received
separate trials and hearings spread across the country. Depending
on witness availability and the willingness of victims to travel or
work with dozens of separate prosecutors, this method could have
been fatal to the successful prosecution of these cases.

IV. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL RICO AS WEAPONS AGAINST
CHILD EXPLOITATION
An existing remedy against illicit enterprises is the Racketeer
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), which makes it illegal to
acquire, operate, or receive income from an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, and provides both criminal and
civil remedies.20 Originally passed to fight organized crime, the
broad wording of RICO has allowed it to be applied in a wide variety
of cases. Although it has not been used widely to fight child
exploitation, the organized structure of this industry lends itself
well to RICO suits. Prosecutors who apply RICO to child
exploitation enterprise cases can benefit from its focus on the
States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2012) (dismissing conspiracy
charge due to Double Jeopardy with CEE charge).
18. Grovo, 653 Fed.Appx. 512.
19. Press Release, Georgia Man Pleads Guilty to Participating in
International Child Pornography Ring Dismantled by International Law
Enforcement Effort, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 14, 2010), archi
ves.fbi.gov/archives/losangeles/press-releases/2010/la121410.htm.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
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actions of the enterprise as a whole rather than the requirement for
individual criminal actions.

A. RICO’s History and Traditional Use
Under RICO, simply belonging to an enterprise involved in a
pattern of racketeering activity is a crime, even if the activity was
actually committed by others. Specifically, RICO prohibits (1) using
income from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest
of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (2) acquiring or
maintaining an interest in an enterprise affecting interstate
commerce with funds acquired through a pattern of racketeering
activity, (3) conducting or participating in an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity, or
(4) conspiring to commit any of the above.21 The broad prohibitions
established under RICO can be applied to child exploitation
enterprises.
RICO provides both criminal and civil remedies. Under
criminal RICO, defendants may be sentenced up to twenty years in
prison and forced to forfeit their assets. These penalties are in
addition to any sentences defendants may receive for the
racketeering activity itself.22 Defendants may be convicted for
criminal acts committed by other members of their enterprise if (1)
the acts were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement and (2)
the acts were foreseeable to the defendant.23 Further, because RICO
is based on a pattern of racketeering activity, it enables prosecutors
to bring cases that include acts that would otherwise be time-barred
by the statute of limitations. Charging leaders of child exploitation
enterprises under RICO would provide greater accountability for
the acts of creating and maintaining the organization itself.
Civil RICO allows the government, or a party injured in their
property or business by the defendant’s actions, to bring suit.
Plaintiffs can request the defendants forfeit any property, enjoin
defendants from engaging in a particular enterprise or business, or
dissolve an enterprise. The government may also engage in civil
forfeiture of the defendant’s property based solely on probable
cause. Civil RICO is controversial but intended to repair the
economic damage inherent in the operation of a business through
racketeering activity. Using civil RICO to combat child exploitation
enterprises would provide a powerful weapon for the victims of
exploitation themselves.
It took a number of years for federal prosecutors to adopt RICO
into their standard practice. The statute’s enterprise-based

21. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2012).
22. CRIMINAL RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS (United States
Department of Justice), www.justice.gov/usam/file/870856/download.
23. Id.
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approach was so different from traditional criminal laws that the
amount of new knowledge required for charging, much less
convicting, someone under these laws initially provided a
significant chilling effect. Today, similar concerns limit prosecutors
from expanding RICO to the extent technically possible under the
plain language of the statute. As explained later in this paper, there
would be potential benefits to this expansion, but RICO is not
frequently used in response to child exploitation enterprises at the
present time.
The first major RICO cases involved mob leaders who were so
far removed from street-level crime that they were essentially
immune from traditional criminal laws. Most notably, starting in
1985 with the Mafia Commission Trial, RICO was successfully used
to imprison virtually all leaders of the New York Mafia.24 However,
it quickly became apparent that RICO could be used for broader
purposes; today, practically any ongoing criminal association is
eligible for a RICO prosecution. Three primary elements are
required for RICO: (1) an enterprise, (2) pattern, (3) of “racketeering
activity.”25 A closer look at how these elements can be applied to
child exploitation enterprises will show that these enterprises
should be considered strong cases for criminal RICO enforcement.

B. Elements Necessary to Prosecute Under Criminal
RICO
The first question to ask when initiating a RICO proceeding is
whether there was actually an enterprise. RICO itself defines an
enterprise as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.”26 However, this list
“is not exhaustive but merely illustrative.”27 As a result, the
question of what qualifies as an enterprise has been the subject of
most RICO litigation.
Courts are given immense discretion in defining an enterprise;
however, they have struggled with this question for many years. As
one court noted, the definition of “enterprise” is necessarily a
shifting one, given the fluid nature of criminal associations.28 The

24. Richard Stengel, The Passionate Prosecutor, TIME MAGAZINE (June 24,
2001), content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101860210-143096,00.h
tml.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012).
27. RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS (RICO): A
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS, § II(D)(1) 53 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 5th
ed. 2006) (“RICO Manual”). But see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 18283 (1993) (explaining that courts should not apply RICO to purposes Congress
never intended to reach).
28. United States v. Swiderksi, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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Supreme Court has set a number of standards. However, in general,
it appears there is almost no limit on the types of associations-infact which may qualify as enterprises under RICO.29
The Supreme Court has found that an enterprise must be
something distinct and separate from its members; it cannot be the
defendants simply by another name.30 There must be some
mechanism for directing the affairs of the group; it cannot simply
be an ad hoc relationship between peers.
RICO enterprises can be either formal organizations, such as
private businesses or companies, or “associations-in-fact,” which
encompasses both legal and illegal informal relationships. Not
every conspiracy is an enterprise.31 An association-in-fact must
have a shared purpose, continuity, and unity. The Supreme Court
recently resolved a circuit split by declaring that associations-infact do not need any structure beyond that “inherent in the pattern
of racketeering activity.”32 However, the defendant must have
somehow engaged in the “operation or management” of the
enterprise.33 This does not mean that he must be the actual leader,
but usually street-level members will not qualify for criminal RICO
charges.
The second requirement for a RICO action is that the
defendant has engaged in a “pattern” of “racketeering activity.” The
requirement of a pattern is simple—there must be more than two
occasions of racketeering activity over the past ten years. This is a
relatively simple factual inquiry; the defendant does not have to be
convicted of this pattern prior to being charged under RICO.34
Crimes of which the defendant has been acquitted may also
qualify.35
The Oxford Dictionary defines racketeering activity as
“dishonest or fraudulent business dealings.”36 However, the
definition of this term is slightly more specific for RICO. Under 18
U.S.C. 1961, racketeering activity includes any one of thirty-five
predicate offenses. These offenses range from the more obvious
bribery and counterfeiting statutes to the less clear crime of
threatened use of nuclear weapons. Relevant to the prosecution of
child exploitation enterprises are the predicate offenses of
production, possession, receipt, or distribution of child pornography
and buying or selling of children.

29. RICO Manual, supra note 27.
30. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001).
31. Bachman v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1999).
32. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 945-48 (2009).
33. Reves, 507 U.S. at 182.
34. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 488 (1985).
35. United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 1991).
36. Racketeering, OXFORD DICTIONARY, en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition
/racketeering (last visited May 9, 2017).
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C. Use of RICO for Child Exploitation Enterprises
RICO claims against child exploitation enterprises are
uncommon. Civil RICO would have to be amended before it could be
successfully applied in this context. Criminal RICO is applicable
currently, but it has been rarely utilized until very recently.
Although the recent use of criminal RICO to fight child exploitation
enterprises is promising, the recent passage of the Child
Exploitation Enterprise statute, discussed in part III, offers a better
alternative.
1. Why Civil RICO Cannot Currently Be Used Against
Child Exploitation Enterprises
Some plaintiffs have attempted to use civil RICO to combat
child exploitation; however, none of these suits have been
successful. The current civil RICO action would need to be amended
to handle child exploitation enterprises. As it currently stands, civil
RICO’s requirement that plaintiffs have injury to their “business or
property” simply bars victims of child exploitation from successfully
litigating such a claim.
The Catholic Church child abuse scandal exposed in the mid2000s is the source of most attempts to use civil RICO in the child
exploitation context. In 2007, Hoatson v. New York Archdiocese
considered a civil RICO suit from a former church employee against
the Catholic Church after he was allegedly terminated for reporting
a conspiracy to conceal the sexual abuse of minors.37 Unfortunately,
his complaint was “wholly deficient” and lacking in any details to
show how his supervisors in the church qualified as an enterprise
and did not make a tangible connection between his firing and the
child exploitation itself.38 In fact, the plaintiff’s lawyer was
sanctioned for even bringing a civil RICO case under these facts.39
Civil RICO cases usually end similarly to Hoatson, although
the fatal detail is often that of establishing standing. In Magnum v.
Archdiocese of Philadelphia, twelve former victims of sexual abuse
at the hands of multiple priests brought a civil RICO suit against
the city’s archdiocese for a conspiracy to conceal the abuse for over
fifty years. To meet civil RICO’s “injury to property” requirement,
plaintiffs alleged three harms: (1) severe emotional distress
resulting in loss of earnings and earning capacity, (2) out of pocket
medical expenses, and (3) loss of ability to pursue a different tort
due to the plaintiff’s conspiracy to conceal the abuse.
The court found that none of these harms alleged in Magnum
were sufficient to sustain standing for civil RICO. Personal injuries

37. Hoatson v. New York Archdiocese, 2007 WL 431098 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10.
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and economic losses derived therefrom are not qualifying injuries to
property in the Third Circuit.40 The medical expenses associated
with treating these injuries were derivative and similarly
insufficient.41 Finally, the court squarely rejected “loss of tort
claims” as an injury to property. Ability to bring a tort claim is not
"property" under Pennsylvania law, so loss of that ability was
irrelevant for civil RICO standing.
To better respond to child exploitation, Congress should amend
civil RICO to allow plaintiffs with personal injuries that have
limited their earning potential to bring suits against qualifying
abusive enterprises. The requirement that victims have suffered
some financial injury will limit this extension to only more serious
claims. Professor Marci Hamilton at Cardozo School of Law argued
that “surely a pattern of abetting or covering up abuse is as, or more,
insidious as a pattern of committing arson against non-paying
shopkeepers.”42 Hamilton’s argument points out the apparent
hypocrisy in civil RICO’s current standing requirements.
The standing requirement of civil RICO as it is currently
drafted specifically excludes the most vulnerable victims simply
because of their vulnerability. Plaintiffs who are unable to work due
to their trauma from exploitation are clearly hurt in their ability to
operate a business or support themselves financially. Civil RICO
would best serve the interests of preventing and punishing criminal
enterprises if it eliminated this disconnect.
2. The Troubled History of Using Criminal RICO Against
Child Exploitation
Criminal RICO explicitly includes the crimes of possession,
production, receipt, and distribution of child pornography and the
buying or selling of children for sexual purposes as “racketeering
activity.” 43 If any enterprise engages in two or more of these
predicate offenses within ten years, its members will face up to
twenty years in prison. However, prosecutors have avoided bringing
criminal RICO charges for child exploitation until very recently.
This practice is unlikely to expand due to the growing use of the
CEE statute discussed below in Part V.
Criminal RICO is well suited to fight child exploitation
enterprises. As opposed to civil RICO, which needs amendment
before it can be applied in child exploitation cases, criminal RICO
can be applied in its current form.44 Criminal RICO also offers an
40. Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991).
41. Id.
42. Marci Hamilton, Give laws strength to take down child molesters,
FINDLAW (June 18, 2005), www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/16/hamilton.child.supp
ort/index.html?iref=newssearch.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012).
44. Marci Hamilton, The Child Sex Abuse Scandals are All the Same and

2017]

Shutting Down the Child Exploitation Industry

71

advantage over the traditional conspiracy statute in that it does not
require proof of an overt act “to effect the object of the conspiracy.”45
This makes RICO a strong option for prosecuting enterprise leaders
on whom little direct evidence of culpability can be gathered.
Criminal RICO prosecutors can bring separate charges for the
RICO violation and conspiracy to commit the violation, as well as
each of the predicate offenses to maximize prison sentences.
Although this method of prosecution is controversial, one court
commented, “Congress clearly intended to permit, and perhaps
sought to encourage, the imposition of cumulative sentences for
RICO offenses and the underlying crimes.”46 Unfortunately, despite
its benefits, it is rare for a criminal RICO charge to bear on child
exploitation cases, and convictions are very rare.
There are a variety of reasons that explain why criminal RICO
charges are not brought in exploitation enterprise cases. Since 2009,
the main reason is likely that the CEE statute (to be discussed in
Part V) covers these enterprises. However, the CEE statute does not
have the benefit of over a half-century of precedent in organized
crime like RICO does.
Another reason that RICO cases are not often seen in response
to child exploitation enterprises is that, depending on the
enterprise, some such cases may be politically unpopular. For
example, a number of legislators called for RICO charges to be filed
against the Vatican in the wake of the Catholic Church’s
international sex abuse scandal.47 However, the Vatican engages in
a number of crucial diplomatic roles considered vitally important to
America’s interests.48 Such a prosecution would “seem like career
suicide” and put the United States directly at odds with an
important global partner.49 Although a few jurisdictions attempted
to bring RICO charges against individual dioceses of the Church,
none were successful, and no charges were ever filed against the
Catholic Church as a whole.
Nonetheless, RICO itself says it should be “liberally construed
to effectuate its remedial purposes,” which indicates Congress
encourages prosecutors to break new ground with RICO.50 The

They Demand the Government to Act, VERDICT (Mar. 22, 2017), verdict.justia.co
m/2017/03/22/child-sex-abuse-scandals-demand-government-act.
45. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997).
46. United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 864 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing
United States v. Sutton, 700 F.2d 1078, 1081 (6th Cir. 1983)).
47. Laurie Goodstein, As Pennsylvania Confronts Clergy Sex Abuse, Victims
and Lawmakers Act, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/u
s/pennsylvania-clergy-sex-abuse.html.
48. Will Carless, Could the Vatican face racketeering charges for harboring
abusive clergy?, PRI (Sept. 25, 2015), www.pri.org/stories/2015-09-25/could-vati
can-face-racketeering-charges-harboring-abusive-clergy-0.
49. Hamilton, supra note 41.
50. Organized Crime Control Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title
IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
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Supreme Court endorses this view, saying “[t]he fact that RICO has
been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth.”51
Unfortunately, courts have not supported criminal RICO cases
against child exploitation enterprises in many cases. In 2002,
federal prosecutors attempted to bring criminal RICO charges
against clergy in the Catholic Church for their mishandling of child
abuse allegations.52 However, the grand jury failed to indict, the
case was dropped, and there have been no further attempts to bring
criminal RICO charges in connection with this scandal.
This is not to say that criminal RICO is a dead end when it
comes to child exploitation. In United States v. Pipkins, two pimps
engaged in a human trafficking and child prostitution ring in
Atlanta were convicted under criminal RICO.53 These defendants
essentially forced young girls into sex slavery. The victims were not
paid and were entirely dependent on the defendants for food,
clothing, and shelter.
At the time Pipkins was brought to trial, sex trafficking was
not a predicate act under RICO. However, prosecutors were able to
identify a number of existing predicate offenses in this case ranging
from kidnapping to transportation of prostitutes across state lines.
The challenge in Pipkins, and in RICO cases in general, was to
establish an enterprise. Each defendant alleged he was an
independent contractor rather than working in concert with one
another. However, their actions spoke louder than their words.
Prosecutors were able to identify a code of conduct and procedures
in the ring. Further, the defendants often acted together in
transporting their victims across state lines, when renting rooms,
and in setting prices for their victims’ services.54 Both defendants
charged under criminal RICO were convicted, proving that child
exploitation enterprises are viable targets for RICO prosecution.
Recently, RICO has been used in more traditional human
trafficking rings with some success. Although human trafficking
was added as a predicate offense in 2003, it was not until 2009 that
a RICO indictment was issued for this crime. In United States v.
Askarkhodjaev, eleven individuals were charged with 143 counts for
their operation of Giant Labor Solutions.55 Giant Labor trafficked
hundreds of laborers illegally into the United States, provided them
51. Sedima, 473 U.S. 479, 499 (quoting Harco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank &
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (1984)).
52. Marci Hamilton, The Time Has Come for A Restatement of Child Sex
Abuse, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 397, 414 (2014) (citing an online news article that is
no longer available).
53. United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (vacated on
other grounds).
54. Prosecuting Pimps Under Rico: The Story of the Nation's First Federal
Prosecutor to Fight Child Prostitution Through Organized Crime Laws,
PROSECUTOR 21 (Oct. 2010).
55. United States v. Ashkarkhodiaev, 2010 WL 4038783 (W.D. Mo. 2010).
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with fake visas and substandard housing, and threatened their
families if they attempted to leave.56
Giant Labor provided jobs for the laborers it trafficked;
however, after collecting various fees – such as visa extension costs
regardless of whether the visa was actually extended or even valid
– many laborers ended up with paychecks for negative earnings.57
As a result, the workers were unable to pay their debts or leave.
In the end, RICO charges were dropped in the Giant Labor case
in exchange for the defendants’ plea to many of the predicate
offenses. The head of the enterprise admitted to “commit[ing] forced
labor trafficking, visa fraud, fraud in foreign labor contracting,
transportation of illegal aliens, extortion, interstate travel in aid of
racketeering, money laundering, and mail and wire fraud, as part
of a pattern of racketeering.”58 Giant Labor was subsequently
dissolved, thus proving that human trafficking and other
enterprises based on the exploitation of powerless individuals can
be successfully fought using criminal RICO.

V. THE CHILD EXPLOITATION ENTERPRISE STATUTE
The Child Exploitation Enterprise (CEE) statute was passed in
2009 and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g). It is based on the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute and is similar to RICO.
However, the CEE statute focuses more on the individual
defendants and their personal crimes rather than their enterprise.
It is an intermediary between RICO and traditional child
exploitation laws. Although very little scholarship yet exists on the
CEE statute, it has been successfully used to prosecute and
dismantle a number of high-profile exploitative enterprises.
The CEE statute criminalizes participation in child
exploitation enterprises, which it defines as:
A person engages in a child exploitation enterprise for the purposes
of this section if the person violates section 1591, section 1201 if the
victim is a minor, or chapter 109A (involving a minor victim), 110
(except for sections 2257 and 2257A), or 117 (involving a minor
victim), as a part of a series of felony violations constituting three or
more separate incidents and involving more than one victim, and
commits those offenses in concert with three or more other persons.
59

56. Id. at para. 1.
57. Id.
58. Press Release, Eight Uzbekistan Nationals Among 12 Charged with
Racketeering, Human Trafficking & Immigration Violations in Scheme to
Employ Illegal Aliens in 14 States, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (May 27, 2009), www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/eight-uzbekistan-nationals-among-12-charged-racketeeringhuman-trafficking-immigration.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(g) (2012).
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Those convicted under the CEE statute face a minimum
twenty-year sentence. Although there is no express requirement
that the statute be saved for the worst offenders, courts have
interpreted the CEE statute this way for reasons discussed below.
It has primarily been used to prosecute child pornography rings.
However, the statute has obviously much broader potential
application.

A. Applying Continuing Criminal Enterprise Precedent
to CEE Cases
Because of its relatively recent establishment, very little legal
scholarship exists on the CEE statute. However, courts may base
much of their interpretation of the CEE statute on its model – the
1970 Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (the “Kingpin
Statute”).60 The Kingpin Statute expressly adds additional
penalties to those proven to be principal administrators of major
narcotics enterprises.61
Many courts have been willing to use precedent from the
Kingpin Statute when interpreting the frankly vague language of
the CEE statute.62 For example, given the similarity between the
two statutes, the Eleventh Circuit expressly noted that Continuing
Criminal Enterprise precedent should be persuasive when
confronting CEE cases in United States v. McGarity.63
The McGarity court answered two challenges to a CEE
indictment with Continuing Criminal Enterprise precedent. The
first argument was that each predicate offense must be pled with
specificity in the CEE indictment. While the court conceded that the
prosecution must prove each of the predicate offenses to successfully
litigate a CEE charge, it found there was no need for such specificity
at the indictment stage.64
The Eleventh Circuit drew its conclusion in McGarity from
United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, a Continuing Criminal Enterprise
case that confronted the same question.65 In Alvarez-Moreno, the
court stated that the predicate offenses “need not be charged or even
set forth as predicate acts in the indictment.”66 Instead, “[t]he law
only requires evidence that the defendant committed three

60. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2012).
61. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(1) (2012).
62. See, e.g., United States v. DeFoggi, 839 F.3d 701, 710 (8th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 413 (6th Cir. 2011); Wayerski, 624 F.3d at 1351.
63. United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2012).
64. Id. at 1237.
65. United States v. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d 1402, 1408-11 (11th Cir.
1989); see also United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171, 1181 (11th Cir.
2009) (approving of Alvarez-Moreno’s approach to specificity of indictments).
66. Alvarez-Moreno, 874 F.2d at 1408.
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substantive offenses to provide the predicate for a [CCE] violation,
regardless of whether such offenses were charged in counts of the
indictment.”67
The McGarity court affirmed this language and helpfully noted
that courts considering CEE cases should consider Continuing
Criminal Enterprise precedent. “We see no reason to vary from this
holding for a conviction under [the CEE statute], which the parties
(and at least one of our sister circuits) agree should be interpreted
similarly to [the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute].” The
consequence of this interpretation is that though the CEE statute
is barely a decade old, advocates for its application can point to over
a half-century of precedent.
The second issue in McGarity that was addressed with
Continuing Criminal Enterprise precedent was whether the district
court was obligated to instruct the jury that it had to unanimously
agree on the specific instances in which the defendant violated the
CEE statute.
The court drew from Supreme Court precedent in handling the
same question in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise case and found
in the affirmative. In other words, when a defendant charged under
the CEE statute for more than three instances of the predicate
offenses, the court must give a jury instruction that they must
unanimously agree on at least three specific instances of guilt.68
In United States v. Daniels, the Sixth Circuit noted that
“federal courts have had little opportunity to consider the elements
required for a conviction under [the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statute].”69 However, given the similar language—
“series of … violations” and “in concert with … other persons”— it
felt the precedent from the CCE statute was appropriate to apply to
CEE cases.70
The Eighth Circuit also drew from Continuing Criminal
Enterprise precedent when interpreting the requirement that CEE
defendants have committed at least three instances of child
exploitation “in concert with” at least three other individuals.
Helpfully, this same language appears in the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statue. In Rutledge v. United States, the Supreme Court
explained that “in concert with” requires a mutual agreement in
common plan or enterprise sufficient to establish a conspiracy.71
Based on this holding, the Eighth Circuit held that simply being a
member of an online child pornography website does not constitute
working “in concert with” others to the extent necessary to convict
under the CEE statute.
67. Id. at 1408-09.
68. Id. (ultimately this finding was inconsequential for six of the seven
defendants as they were simultaneously convicted of three predicate offenses).
69. Daniels, 653 F.3d at 411.
70. Id. at 412.
71. Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300 (1996).
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Given the fifty-seven years of precedent which has been
established under the Kingpin Statute, it should be relatively
simple for courts considering CEE cases to find supporting material.
Indeed, when compared to the gradual and over-cautious use of
RICO to handle child exploitation, it is clear courts and prosecutors
have embraced the CEE statute. This is likely due to the existence
of rich precedent under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute
that guides CEE decisions and arguments.

B. Benefits of the CEE Statute Over Individual-Based
Approaches
Although the CEE statute was recently enacted and has little
legal scholarship, it has already led to a surprisingly large number
of high-profile convictions. Most individuals convicted under the
CEE statute are the leaders of online child pornography rings.
Given the mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years,
prosecutors have been eager to use the CEE statute in this context
to avoid handling each potential charge separately.
The clear advantage of the CEE statute over traditional child
pornography laws in handling online child pornography rings is
easy to demonstrate. On May 5, 2017, Steven Chase, the founder of
a major child pornography distribution website named “Playpen”
boasting some 150,000 users worldwide, was sentenced to thirty
years’ imprisonment under the CEE statute. His two co-defendants
were each sentenced to twenty years under the same statute.72
In the realm of CEE convictions, these are relatively light
sentences. However, Chase’s co-defendants quickly pled guilty to
the CEE charge and were given leniency. Chase himself is already
nearly sixty; his sentence is essentially a life sentence. Further,
Chase was ordered to forfeit all property traceable to his criminal
activities, including his home. Each defendant, including Chase,
received a life term of supervised release.
Evidence gathered through the Playpen investigation has led
to at least 520 arrests, the conviction of 51 hands-on child molesters
and 25 child pornography producers, and the rescue of 55 American
children who were subject to sexual abuse.73 In total, tens of
thousands of items of child pornography were found in the Playpen
investigation.
Prosecutors did not have to present every piece of evidence at
trial to convict the ringleaders under the CEE statute. Instead they
72. Press Release, ‘Playpen’ Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (May 5, 2017), www.fbi.gov/news/stories/playpencreator-sentenced-to-30-years.
73. Press Release, Florida Man Sentenced to Prison for Engaging in a Child
Exploitation Enterprise, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 1,
2017), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-man-sentenced-prison-engaging-child-ex
ploitation-enterprise.
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only needed to establish the pattern of offenses. Under traditional
child pornography laws, prosecutors would have been forced to focus
on the individual offenses. Pursuing charges under the CEE statute
is more efficient than the traditional individual-based charges and
helps investigations focus on the bigger picture when handling child
exploitation enterprises.
The CEE statute also allows for the possibility of life
imprisonment. This is not usually an option considered under
traditional child exploitation laws. In United States v. Gmoser, a
man received a life sentence under the CEE statute for running a
child pornography website with over thirty thousand members.
Additionally, investigators found he was in possession of “millions
of files depicting the sexual exploitation of children.”74 Cases like
Gmoser demonstrate the additional culpability of the leaders of
exploitation enterprises that demanded the creation of the CEE
statute and its strict sentencing range.
In contrast, under the traditional child exploitation statutes,
sentencing can be more lenient. For example, in 2014 a defendant
was sentenced to just seventy-eight months imprisonment for
possession of “more than five million images of child pornography”
on his computer.75
Similarly, in United States v. Lockett, three men pled guilty to
a single count of sex trafficking of a minor and each received less
than twenty years’ imprisonment.76 The men had abducted
underage girls in Chicago and forced them into prostitution,
charging more than $100 per hour. When the girls tried to escape,
the defendants “slapped, choked, and even threatened [them] with
death.”
The Lockett case would have likely been a solid candidate for
CEE charges had there been a fourth conspirator. There were three
men organizing the underage prostitution ring. They had more than
one victim and engaged in more than three occasions of kidnapping
of a minor, a predicate offense for the CEE statute. Further, there
was clear evidence that these men worked together in an
enterprise—one was the father of the other two, who were twins.77

74. Press Release, Ohio Man Sentenced to Life in Prison for Engaging in a
Child Exploitation Enterprise, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (July
15, 2016), www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ohio-man-sentenced-life-prison-engaging-chil
d-exploitation-enterprise.
75. Press Release, Southeast Texas man admits possessing more than 5
million child pornography images on his computer, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 30, 2014),
www.ice.gov/news/releases/southeast-texas-man-admits-possessing-more-5million-child-pornography-images-his.
76. Jason Meisner, Father and 2 sons given prison for sex trafficking
underage girls, THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2017), www.chicagotribune.
com/news/local/breaking/ct-father-sons-sex-trafficking-met-20170323story.html.
77. Id.
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Each had a different function in the ring and was dependent on the
other two. Given a fourth defendant, this case would have opened
the door to CEE charges.
The main drawback to bringing charges under the CEE statute
is that its twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence hinders
judicial discretion. This high bar makes it difficult to use against all
enterprise members uniformly. It is difficult to justify a twenty-year
sentence for the most minor players in an enterprise. Effective
prosecution of exploitative enterprises should take into account the
possibility of traditional conspiracy charges or other enterprisebased solutions for less culpable defendants.

VI. A COMPARISON OF RICO, CONSPIRACY LAWS, AND THE
CEE STATUTE
RICO, conspiracy law, and the CEE statute can be used
together to form a comprehensive web of enterprise-based
prosecution of child exploiters. Although these statutes can be used
for very similar purposes and enterprises, the statutes have some
substantive differences. In particular, there are significant
differences in their focus in terms of enforcement, the requirements
for prosecution, sentencing, and possible remedies.
First, RICO has a strictly enterprise-based focus. Its original
purpose was to convict those who were too far removed from streetlevel crime to be criminally liable, but were no less morally culpable.
Conspiracy law generally has a similar focus, thanks to the
Pinkerton rule. In contrast, the CEE statute is more in line with
traditional child exploitation laws in that prosecutors must be able
to prove criminal liability without strictly impugning the guilt of
other members of the enterprise. The CEE’s approach particularly
works well for online child pornography rings today. However,
RICO’s approach will become more suitable if and when such rings
acquire more sophisticated screening technology.
Similarly, RICO and the CEE statute have slightly different
requirements for prosecution when handling child exploitation
cases. Both include the same statutes as predicate offenses.
However, RICO requires only that defendants have committed two
racketeering offenses within ten years in connection with an
enterprise. The CEE statute requires at least three separate
incidents in a series, more than one victim, and at least three other
members of the enterprise. Meanwhile, conspiracy law has no
requirement that any actual criminal offenses have occurred,
merely that steps were taken towards a criminal purpose.
The stricter standard for CEE cases is explained by the
possible sentences offered by the two statutes. Under RICO,
defendants typically face a maximum of twenty years’
imprisonment; the law focuses on punishing wallets more than
filling prisons. However, the CEE statute calls for a minimum
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sentence of twenty years and allows life sentences. As discussed
above in Section III, the CEE statute’s mandatory minimum binds
judicial discretion and requires that it remain a weapon used
sparingly. Conspiracy law is a friendlier option for courts, both in
sentencing and in institutional competence.
The differences between RICO and the CEE statute paint a
picture of how they should operate when handling child exploitation
enterprises. RICO should be used to prosecute leaders of
exploitative enterprises, those who are more connected to profiting
from the exploitation than committing it themselves. These
individuals do not go to prison for very long, but their prosecution
allows the court to completely dismantle the enterprise and
compensate victims. Meanwhile, the CEE statute can be used for
enterprise leaders who were more closely involved in the abuse
itself.
Although civil RICO cannot feasibly be used in child
exploitation cases today, it could be easily modified to suit them.
This would add a powerful option for victims of child exploitation
that is not currently available. It could be used in cases involving
criminal RICO and CEE prosecution. Civil RICO could level the
playing field for victims who do not see the differences in culpability
between criminal RICO and CEE defendants.

VII. CONCLUSION
As long as there are people willing to pay for the exploitation
of children, there will be businesses willing to provide it.
Unfortunately, the traditional individual-based method of
prosecution is not the best way to handle these enterprises. As these
enterprises continue to build online followings, it has become clear
that an enterprise-based method of prosecution is the more
appropriate method. Anything less is simply treading water until
someone comes up with a new way to avoid detection.
An enterprise-based method of prosecution focuses on the
actions and knowledge of its members. In particular, RICO, the
CEE statute, and conspiracy laws allow prosecutors to impute this
knowledge to members who would otherwise be nearly impossible
to convict. By stopping an enterprise at its source, prosecutors are
able to efficiently and effectively cut off outlets for individuals to
profit off the exploitation of children. Child exploitation will
continue even without profit, but as shown by the success of RICO
in response to organized crime, this is an important step.
Prosecutors could use RICO itself against child exploitation.
Congress has made it clear that they want RICO to be used
liberally; its original intent to combat organized crime should not be
considered a restriction on the possibilities it could offer today.
However, this shift in criminal RICO use is unlikely to occur. The
institutional knowledge necessary to manipulate the massive RICO
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code into the complicated issues of child exploitation would be
difficult for even the most sophisticated courts.
However, civil RICO should be amended to allow victims of
exploitative enterprises to bring suits. These victims are no less
harmed by their abusers than are "threatened shopkeepers."
Although civil RICO was designed to compensate those whose
businesses are hurt, it currently does not assist those who are
unable to work due to immense trauma caused by exploitation. This
is a major flaw to the act and should be corrected.
Prosecutors have acknowledged the strength of an enterprisebased approach against child exploitation enterprises through their
frequent use of conspiracy law and their growing use of the CEE
statute. This area of prosecution will likely grow in upcoming years
as enterprises adapt to avoid detection, particularly for onlinebased enterprises.
Child exploitation enterprises are not going anywhere anytime
soon. RICO has showed that traditional methods of prosecution
merely force prosecutors to wait for evidence that will never come.
The traditional approach simply did not recognize that child
exploitation enterprises are more than the sum of their parts – they
are an entity all on their own. Prosecutors need to recognize this
problem and fundamentally shift their focus onto the enterprises
themselves. This is our best hope for the safety of hundreds of
thousands of children who are at risk of exploitation today.

